Rule 13 of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario: Scope and Limits of Preliminary Dismissal

Rule 13 of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Rules of Procedure permits the Tribunal to dismiss an application at an early stage without a hearing where it concludes that the application falls outside its jurisdiction. While this mechanism serves an important gatekeeping function, recent case law confirms that its scope is narrow and must be exercised with caution.

Rule 13 allows the Tribunal, on its own initiative, to issue a Notice of Intent to Dismiss where it appears that an application does not engage the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Human Rights Code. The applicant is then given an opportunity to respond in writing before a final determination is made. At this stage, the respondent is typically not required to participate.

The purpose of Rule 13 is administrative efficiency. It enables the Tribunal to screen out applications that clearly have no connection to the Code, such as complaints based solely on general unfairness, personality conflicts, or matters falling within the jurisdiction of other legal regimes. However, the Rule is not intended to function as a substitute for a hearing on the merits.

The governing legal threshold for dismissal under Rule 13 is whether it is “plain and obvious” that the application falls outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This is a high threshold. If there is any arguable basis upon which the application could engage a Code-protected ground in a protected social area, the matter should proceed.

The Divisional Court’s decision in Bokhari v Top Medical Transportation Services provides important guidance on the limits of Rule 13. In that case, the Tribunal dismissed an application at the screening stage after concluding that the applicant’s ankle injury did not constitute a disability under the Code. The Tribunal applied a “balance of probabilities” standard and effectively determined that the claim could not succeed.

The Court held that this approach was unreasonable for several reasons.

First, Rule 13 is confined to jurisdictional screening. It is not a mechanism for deciding substantive elements of a human rights claim. Questions such as whether a particular condition constitutes a disability, whether discrimination occurred, or whether a duty to accommodate arose are matters that go to the merits and ordinarily require an evidentiary record.

Second, the Court confirmed that the “plain and obvious” standard continues to govern Rule 13 determinations. A lower standard, such as a balance of probabilities, risks prematurely dismissing claims that may ultimately succeed once evidence is presented. The Tribunal cannot use Rule 13 to weigh evidence or choose between competing lines of authority.

Third, the decision underscores the importance of a broad and contextual interpretation of Code rights. In the context of disability, the Tribunal must apply a multidimensional analysis that considers both medical and social factors. Attempting to resolve such issues at a preliminary stage, without a factual record, is inconsistent with the purposes of human rights legislation.

The practical distinction between Rule 13 and other procedural tools is critical. While Rule 13 addresses jurisdiction, Rule 19A permits summary hearings where the Tribunal may determine whether there is no reasonable prospect of success. Even then, procedural fairness and an adequate evidentiary foundation are required. A full hearing remains the default where material facts are in dispute or where the legal issues require contextual analysis.

For practitioners, the implications are clear. Applicants should ensure that their pleadings identify a connection between the alleged adverse treatment and a Code-protected ground. Even a modest factual foundation may be sufficient to survive Rule 13 scrutiny. Respondents, on the other hand, should recognize that Rule 13 is not a substitute for a merits-based defence and that attempts to resolve substantive issues at this stage are unlikely to succeed.