General Principles of Interpretation
The Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered this question in 2023.
The first step in the review is to read the words in the full context and in "their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament". 1
In considering statutes of an administrative law character, the interpretation must be “consistent with the text, context and purpose, applying its particular insight into the statutory scheme at issue”.
In determining the meaning of human rights legislation, the well-accepted mode of interpretation is to allow for a “fair, large and liberal interpretation”3 of such legislation. Human rights legislation has been described as “not quite constitutional, but certainly more than ordinary”4. Such legislation is not to be interpreted “on a strictly grammatical analysis”5. Quasi-constitutional statutes must be read contextually6. 7
These principles must be borne in mind when considering the meaning of discrimination, as stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal is determining the issue of citizenship of the Code. 8
Given that human rights legislation is considered to be quasi-constitutional, it supersedes any other statute with which it may be in conflict, unless the contrary intent is clearly expressed in the second statute. 9
As noted by the Supreme Court, the definition is one which is not fixed in time. It is organic and flexible. 10
More generally, in Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at pp. 383-84, Professor R. Sullivan summarized as follows the rules of interpretation that apply to human rights legislation:
(1) Human rights legislation is given a liberal and purposive interpretation. Protected rights receive a broad interpretation, while exceptions and defences are narrowly construed.
(2) In responding to general terms and concepts, the approach is organic and flexible. The key provisions of the legislation are adapted not only to changing social conditions but also to evolving conceptions of human rights.
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