Statutes and Age Issues
Ontario’s abolition of mandatory retirement did not eliminate every statutory distinction based on age. Exceptions remain relevant to employee benefit plans and workers’ compensation. Their constitutional validity must be examined separately: a successful challenge to one age restriction does not necessarily invalidate another.
Ontario: Employee Benefit Plans
The Statutory Exemption
Section 25(2.1) of the Ontario Human Rights Code provides an exemption for employee benefit, pension, superannuation and group insurance plans that comply with the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and its regulations.
The benefits regulation defines “age” as an age of 18 years or more and less than 65 years. Consequently, the statutory framework permits certain distinctions affecting employees aged 65 and older, notwithstanding the general prohibition against age discrimination in employment. 1
The existence of this exemption does not resolve whether its application complies with the Charter.
The Earlier Arbitration: Chatham-Kent
In Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Municipality of Chatham-Kent, the union challenged age-based reductions and exclusions in employee benefits.
Arbitrator Etherington found that the statutory framework infringed s. 15 of the Charter, but concluded that the infringement was justified under s. 1. The legislative objective was to abolish mandatory retirement without undermining the financial viability of existing benefit plans. 2
The reasons drew upon the observation in McKinney that age differs from other protected characteristics because aging is a shared experience. That observation formed part of the analysis; it does not, by itself, justify an age restriction.
Talos: A Different Result on a Later Record
The issue was reconsidered in Talos v. Grand Erie District School Board. The applicant continued working after age 65, but his employer terminated his health, dental and life insurance benefits.
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found that the statutory exemption infringed s. 15 of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1 on the evidence before it. The exemption was therefore unavailable to the school board as a defence to the applicant’s discrimination claim. 3
The evidentiary record was important. The Tribunal had actuarial and other evidence unavailable in the earlier arbitration, including evidence concerning the financial sustainability of benefits for employees continuing to work after age 65.
Talos should not be described as a superior court declaration striking the exemption from the legislation for all purposes. It was a Tribunal determination refusing to apply the exemption in the proceeding before it.
Nor did Talos decide the constitutional validity of age restrictions in long-term disability insurance, pension or superannuation plans.
Long-Term Disability: A Separate Inquiry
A later arbitration illustrates the importance of distinguishing between benefits.
In Rayonier v. Unifor, Locals 256 and 89, Arbitrator Knopf upheld the termination of long-term disability coverage at age 65 in the particular circumstances before her. The pension arrangements, continuing benefits and evidentiary record were material to the conclusion that the restriction was justified under s. 1. 4
The arbitrator distinguished Talos, which had not concerned long-term disability coverage.
The life insurance grievance succeeded on the wording of the collective agreement. The constitutional issue concerning life insurance therefore did not require determination.
The authorities do not support a single answer for every benefit. Health and dental coverage, life insurance, disability income replacement and pensions serve different purposes. The justification for an age restriction must be assessed in its particular statutory, contractual and evidentiary context.
Retirement Status and Age Discrimination
In Law v. Thames Valley District School Board, the school board required retired teachers seeking occasional teaching work to possess qualifications in specified subjects, including French, special education, music or technology. The same requirement did not apply to non-retired applicants.
The Tribunal dismissed the age discrimination complaint. On the evidence before it, the distinction concerned retirement and pension status rather than age. 5
The decision should be read as a finding on its facts. A distinction expressed through retirement or pension status is not necessarily insulated from human rights scrutiny. A claimant may seek to establish that the distinction nevertheless produces adverse treatment connected to age.
Ontario: Workplace Safety and Insurance Act
Age Limits on Loss-of-Earnings Benefits
Ontario’s workers’ compensation legislation treats loss-of-earnings benefits differently from some other benefits available under the scheme.
Section 43(1) provides for the termination of loss-of-earnings benefits at age 65 where the worker was younger than 63 when injured. For a worker injured at age 63 or older, the statutory endpoint is two years after the injury, subject to earlier termination under the other applicable conditions. 6
The two-year period runs from the injury date. It is not a fresh two-year entitlement beginning whenever a later loss of earnings occurs. Accordingly, a worker injured at age 63 or older may encounter the statutory limit where surgery or another injury-related interruption of employment occurs beyond that period.
These restrictions concern loss-of-earnings benefits. They should not be described as terminating every form of workers’ compensation entitlement.
The statutory re-employment obligation also ends at age 65. That limit should be distinguished from any independently applicable human rights obligations. 7
The Human Rights Code Exemption
When Ontario abolished mandatory retirement, it preserved a specific exemption for age distinctions authorized by the workers’ compensation statute.
Section 2.1 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act provides that statutory provisions, regulations, decisions or policies requiring or authorizing distinctions because of age apply despite ss. 1 and 5 of the Human Rights Code. 8
A challenge to the validity of the age restriction therefore raises a Charter question rather than being resolved simply by invoking the Code’s general prohibition against age discrimination.
The Tribunal Challenge
The two-year limit was challenged in Decision No. 512/06.
The Tribunal majority found no violation of s. 15. It characterized the scheme as insurance against lost earnings and accepted evidence concerning retirement patterns and the return to work of older injured workers. The distinction was found to rest on those considerations rather than prejudice or stereotyping. Alternatively, the majority concluded that any infringement was justified under s. 1. 9
The dissent found an unjustified violation of s. 15 and would have allowed loss-of-earnings benefits until age 71.
A reconsideration application was unsuccessful. 10
Gouthro: Judicial Review Dismissed
The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review application in Gouthro v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal. 11
The worker had been injured at age 63 in 2001. The employer maintained a mandatory retirement policy at age 65, and the injury preceded Ontario’s abolition of mandatory retirement.
The Court upheld the conclusion that s. 43(1)(c) did not violate s. 15. It relied on the accepted statistical evidence concerning retirement and return-to-work patterns. Alternatively, it concluded that any infringement would be justified under s. 1.
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal in April 2015. That refusal left the judgment standing; it was not a determination endorsing its reasoning on the merits. 12
Subsequent Application
The issue has been addressed since 2014.
Subsequent Tribunal decisions have continued to apply Gouthro, including Decision No. 483/18.
In Decision No. 1063/22, concerning an injury sustained in 2018, the Tribunal again treated the two-year limit as governed by the existing authorities. 13
The worker had not followed the required procedures for advancing a constitutional challenge. The Tribunal therefore found that the challenge was not properly before it, while also stating that it would fail under the existing authorities.
This was not a fresh constitutional determination based on a fully developed evidentiary record. Nevertheless, it confirms the continuing application of Gouthro, including in a case involving an injury after mandatory retirement was abolished.
The Continuing Question
The statutory restriction remains open to criticism. An employee who would have continued working may lose earnings because of a compensable injury, yet receive no further loss-of-earnings benefits after the statutory endpoint.
However, Talos does not automatically resolve that issue. Employer benefit plans and statutory workers’ compensation involve different provisions, purposes and evidentiary records.
A renewed constitutional challenge would have to confront Gouthro directly. Updated evidence concerning employment beyond age 65, earnings, retirement intentions and the feasibility of alternative rules could be relevant. Such evidence would not, by itself, displace the existing judgment.
Legislative amendment offers a direct means of addressing the position of workers who would otherwise have continued earning income beyond the statutory endpoint.
Other Jurisdictions: Historical Decisions
Age restrictions in workers’ compensation have produced differing constitutional analyses.
In Zaretzki v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), the Court found that the age restriction infringed s. 15, but upheld it under s. 1. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed.
In Laronde v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission), the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the challenged age restriction violated s. 15. 14
These are historical authorities concerning the provisions and records before those courts. They should not be treated as a substitute for examining the current legislation and policies of each jurisdiction.
Distinguishing the Issues
Three questions require separate analysis: whether an age distinction is authorized by statute; whether it is protected from an ordinary statutory human rights complaint; and whether it nevertheless violates the Charter.
A statutory exemption may answer the second question without resolving the third. Equally, a successful constitutional challenge to an employer-benefits exemption does not establish that an age restriction in workers’ compensation is invalid.
Footnotes
- Human Rights Code, s. 25; O. Reg. 286/01, Benefit Plans.
- Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Municipality of Chatham-Kent (2010), 88 CCPB 95, 202 LAC (4th) 1.
- Talos, 2018 HRTO 680.
- Rayonier, 2022 CanLII 75226 (ON LA).
- Law, 2011 HRTO 953.
- Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, s. 43.
- Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, s. 41(7).
- Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, s. 2.1.
- Decision No. 512/06, 2011 ONWSIAT 2525.
- Decision No. 512/06R, 2013 ONWSIAT 2621.
- Gouthro, 2014 ONSC 7289.
- WSIAT Annual Report 2015, p. 21.
- Decision No. 1063/22, July 28, 2022.
- Laronde, 2007 NBCA 10.