When does wage loss begin and end? The two difficult dates in D’Aoust v Foisy Law
The Alberta Human Rights Tribunal awarded an associate lawyer $45,000 in lost income, beginning when her firm told her during maternity leave that she had no long-term future with the law firm. The Tribunal accepted that she ordinarily would have received no salary during the period of maternity leave.
On the other end of the chronology, the decision ended the lost income claim when the applicant found new employment, notwithstanding the fact that she did not receive any income from this new employment for a further three months.
The reasons for choosing those two dates are difficult to reconcile. D’Aoust v Foisy Law, 2026 AHRC 125, paras. 162–175
The October conversation changed the purpose of the leave
Shantale D’Aoust had sustained a traumatic brain injury during her articles and later became an associate at the firm. On October 25, 2022, while she was on maternity leave, Paul Foisy told her she had no long-term future with his law firm. He referred to her injury and suggested government work might be better suited to her. The firm contemplated bringing her back without her own files, principally in a research or support role, for a period of working notice. The Tribunal found that disability and maternity leave were factors in that adverse employment decision. D’Aoust, paras. 98–141
The conversation essentially changed the obligations of D’Aoust during the maternity leave period. Until this conversation she was on maternity leave, expecting to return to the firm. She now had to look for another job while caring for her infant. The Tribunal did not find that the leave formally ended on October 25. Its finding was that the firm deliberately communicated its decision during the leave so she could start looking for work while unpaid. In practical terms, the firm had put her in the position of an employee looking for replacement work before she had even returned from leave. That helps explain both the finding of adverse impact and the separate $30,000 award for injury to dignity. D’Aoust, paras. 149–165 and 171–175
Why did the job search start the wage-loss clock?
The Tribunal’s concern was that the firm should not benefit from treating protected leave as unpaid working notice. Foisy’s own evidence was that if D’Aoust returned, the firm would have paid her during working notice or discussed severance or pay in lieu. The Tribunal also noted that she continued to discharge some professional responsibilities to clients and the courts during leave. It used October 25 as the starting point and awarded nine months at her pre-leave base salary of $5,000 per month. D’Aoust, paras. 162–175
Section 32(1)(b)(iv) of the Alberta Human Rights Act ties compensation to wages or income lost by reason of the contravention. Subparagraph (v) gives the Tribunal broader authority to restore the position the complainant would have occupied absent the discrimination. The Tribunal itself began with that inquiry at para. 162. The immediate need to look for work explains when the consequences of the discrimination began. The wage-loss calculation still requires an answer to a different question. What would D’Aoust have earned during that period? Alberta Human Rights Act, s. 32 · D’Aoust, paras. 162–175
If she would have remained on unpaid leave until her planned return, her regular salary loss would ordinarily begin when she would have resumed paid work. The value of paid notice or pay in lieu could also matter if the firm’s conduct deprived her of it. Likewise, her work on client files during leave could support an award to the extent it would have been paid. The reasons do not establish the value of either loss or explain how it translates into nine months of full salary.
Why did starting a new job stop the wage-loss clock?
D’Aoust joined Spectrum Family Law on July 17, 2023. Her compensation depended on billable receipts, and she did not receive her first significant payment until October 7. She sought compensation through that date. The Tribunal pointed to onboarding, training and the time needed to build a client base. It found too many variables affecting when and how much she would earn and stopped the award on the day she started the new job. D’Aoust, paras. 165–170
That is the more puzzling part of the award. The Tribunal accepted that D’Aoust reasonably mitigated her loss. A lawyer who takes a receipts-based position may have to work for some time before the firm collects the fees on which her compensation depends. Onboarding, training and developing a client base may help explain the shortfall. The reasons leave open why those ordinary features of the replacement job broke the causal link to the loss of her salaried position.
The Tribunal had this to say about the income from new employment:
The complainant asks me to extend wage loss until October 7, 2023, when she received her first significant payment from Spectrum. I decline to do so.
[168] Her compensation at Spectrum depended upon billable receipts. She also required onboarding, training in family law, and time to develop a client base.
[169] Once D’Aoust began working at Spectrum on July 17, too many variables affect the timing and amount of her subsequent receipts for me to conclude, on the evidence before me, that the absence of a significant payment until October remained caused by the respondent’s discrimination.
This is truly a remarkable conclusion. The applicant found employment and yet the income from such employment was delayed due to these factors. The test is reasonable mitigation, which she satisfied. Her income loss was indeed caused by the adverse treatment. The reasoning, with respect, is nonsensical.
That said, there was a legitimate question about proof. The date of the first significant payment alone could not establish the amount of the shortfall. The Tribunal could have examined what she earned or accrued from July 17 onward, when those amounts became payable, and what she would likely have earned over the same period at Foisy Law. The difficulty is the difference in approach. At the beginning, the Tribunal awarded full salary despite accepting that the leave would ordinarily have been unpaid. At the end, it required a substantially closer connection between the discrimination and the earnings shortfall than required by existing law. D’Aoust, paras. 162–175
What the precedents add
- In Silliker v Suncor Energy Inc., 2024 AHRC 91, the Alberta Tribunal measured wage loss up to the anticipated start of the employee’s next maternity leave. The chronology was different, but the case illustrates that expected leave can change the earnings the employee would otherwise have received.
- In Volpi v Lifemark Health Corp., 2026 AHRC 71, the Alberta Tribunal made a substantial wage-loss award while taking account of billing changes that would have affected the employee’s earnings had he remained employed. D’Aoust cites Volpi for the principle that the award should reflect what the complainant would have earned absent the discrimination, with reductions where the evidence warrants them.
- In Chopra v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FCA 268, paras. 35–40, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected common-law foreseeability as a limit on compensation under the federal human rights statute while retaining the requirement of a causal link between the discrimination and the loss claimed. The distinction matters at both ends of the award in D’Aoust.
The Tribunal also declined to deduct EI or maternity benefits. Its reliance on Jack Cewe and Waterman concerns whether benefits should reduce an established loss. That analysis leaves open the prior question of what income D’Aoust would have received during the leave. D’Aoust, paras. 179–183 · Jack Cewe Ltd. v Jorgenson, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 812 · IBM Canada Limited v Waterman, 2013 SCC 70
October 25 marks when the firm’s decision forced D’Aoust to start looking for work. July 17 marks when she found it. The wage-loss award needed to explain when she would otherwise have resumed earning salary and how much of that income the replacement work actually restored. Applying that inquiry consistently could have produced both a later start and a later end to the award.