Same Facts Do Not Mean the Same Issue Was Decided

Two proceedings may arise from the same workplace events while addressing different legal questions. A decision in one does not necessarily resolve the other.

That distinction was decisive in McLeod v. Direct Coil Inc., 2026 ONSC 5369, decided September 28, 2026.

The Ontario Divisional Court quashed a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing an accommodation application because of an earlier Workplace Safety and Insurance Board decision.

The difficulty was straightforward. The WSIB had expressly left the accommodation issue unresolved. The HRTO nevertheless treated that issue as having already been dealt with.

The Workplace Events

Tammy McLeod alleged that her employer denied her request for time off supported by a doctor’s note.

In 2019, she complained to the Ministry of Labour. That proceeding resulted in a determination that there had been no violation of the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

She also filed a human rights application in 2019, alleging disability discrimination arising from the denial of time off.

Her employment ended in 2020. That year, she submitted a WSIB claim for chronic mental distress arising from workload.

The same employment relationship and overlapping events therefore generated proceedings under different statutory regimes.

The decision under review concerned the HRTO’s reliance on the WSIB proceeding.

What the WSIB Actually Decided

The WSIB case manager rejected the compensation claim.

In doing so, the case manager expressly acknowledged that the denial of time off could constitute a failure to accommodate. However, the case manager characterized the decision as part of the employment function and concluded that it did not constitute workplace harassment for the purposes of the compensation claim.

The WSIB did not decide whether Direct Coil had fulfilled its accommodation obligations under the Human Rights Code.

The distinction is fundamental.

A conclusion that the circumstances do not support a compensation award is not necessarily a conclusion that the employer complied with human rights legislation.

The HRTO’s Dismissal

Section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code permits the HRTO to dismiss an application where another proceeding has appropriately dealt with its substance.

The HRTO concluded that the WSIB had concurrent jurisdiction, that the issues were essentially the same, and that McLeod had an opportunity to know the case and respond.

It dismissed her application on that preliminary basis.

Her request for reconsideration was also dismissed.

The Court’s Correction

The Divisional Court held that the dismissal was unreasonable.

At paragraph 10, the Court recorded the HRTO’s acknowledgment that a common factual basis was insufficient.

At paragraph 11, it explained why the earlier proceeding did not resolve the human rights application:

The WSIB expressly acknowledged a potential problem – accommodation – and found that it was outside its mandate.

Despite that express statement, the HRTO concluded that the same issues had been raised and dealt with by the WSIB. The Court described this conclusion as “plainly unreasonable.”

Allowing the human rights application to proceed would not undermine the finality of the WSIB decision. McLeod was not seeking to overturn the compensation result through the human rights process. She was pursuing a question that the WSIB had left undecided.

Factual Overlap and Legal Substance

The conceptual error was to confuse the events giving rise to the proceedings with the issues determined in them.

Both claims involved the employer’s refusal to grant time off. That factual overlap did not establish that both proceedings answered the same question.

The WSIB proceeding addressed entitlement to compensation for the claimed mental distress.

The human rights application addressed whether the refusal of time off constituted disability discrimination, including a failure to accommodate.

Evidence relevant to those questions might overlap substantially. The legal questions nevertheless remained distinct.

For section 45.1 purposes, the inquiry must therefore extend beyond whether the employee has complained elsewhere about the same events. It must identify what the earlier decision actually addressed and whether that proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights application.

An Issue Excluded Is Not an Issue Resolved

An earlier decision must be read for both what it decided and what it declined to decide.

In McLeod, the WSIB’s reasons did more than fail to discuss accommodation. They expressly acknowledged a possible accommodation problem and excluded it from the determination.

That exclusion could not reasonably become the basis for concluding that the accommodation issue had already been resolved.

The HRTO’s approach would have left McLeod unable to pursue an issue in the human rights forum precisely because the compensation forum had declined to address it.

Why the Decision Matters

The outcome does not establish a surprising new principle. Its importance lies in the application of an essential distinction—and in the fact that the error survived reconsideration.

Section 45.1 protects against unnecessary relitigation. It requires attention to the substance of the earlier adjudication, rather than simply the similarity of the factual allegations.

The relevant questions include:

• What legal issue did the earlier decision determine?
• Did it address the alleged discrimination or accommodation failure?
• Did it expressly leave that question unresolved?
• Would the human rights application reopen a decided issue, or require determination of a different one?

These questions cannot be answered merely by observing that both proceedings concern the same workplace events.

The Result and Its Limits

The Divisional Court quashed the dismissal and directed that the application move forward through the HRTO process. It made no costs order.

The Court did not find that Direct Coil discriminated against McLeod. That issue remained undecided.

Nor does McLeod establish that a WSIB proceeding can never support dismissal under section 45.1. The question remains whether the particular proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights application.

The decision also concerns prior adjudication under section 45.1. It does not determine the separate scope of the workers’ compensation statutory bar.

McLeod provides a clear illustration of the governing distinction: the same facts may raise different legal issues, and a decision addressing one cannot be assumed to have resolved the other.